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My comments on the Mexican Law on Inventions and Trade-
marks will be primarily directed to the doctrinal changes in the law
of inventions.
The Mexican Law on Inventions and Trademarks provides the
inventor the opportunity to apply for a certificate of invention as an
alternative to an application for a patent.' However, in certain
cases, notably chemical compounds and processes, only certificates
of invention are available.! It is to these cases that my observations
are directed.
The principal difference between a patent and a certificate of
invention is that a patent provides the exclusive right to make, use
and sell the invention. A certificate of invention permits the inven-
tor to collect royalties, but does not permit the inventor to exclude
others from practicing the invention. The certificate of invention is
a form of protection for intellectual property which is gaining ac-
ceptance among the developing countries. The Paris Convention on
the Protection of Industrial Property3 was amended at Stockholm
in 1967 to provide reciprocal rights under the treaty to those coun-
tries which have traditionally offered certificates of invention, if
those countries would also provide patent protection.' A next step
suggested by the proponents of change in the Paris Convention is
complete reciprocity with those countries that offer one certificates
of invention.5
Stated generally, the reason for providing patent protection is to
* Associate, Jones, Thomas & Askew, Atlanta; Member, Georgia Bar; registered to prac-
tice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; B. Eng. Sci., Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy, 1973; J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 1976.
Law on Inventions and Trademarks, Diario Oficial, Feb. 10, 1976, art. 3.
2 Id. art. 65.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised Dec.
14, 1900 (Brussels), June 2, 1911 (Washington), Nov. 6, 1925 (The Hague), June 2, 1934
(London), Oct. 31, 1958 (Lisbon), July 14, 1967 (Stockholm), [19701 2 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S.
No. 6923, [1973] 2 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 7727, reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 806 (1967)
(entered into force for United States Sept. 5, 1970, with exception of arts. 1-12, which entered
into force for United States Aug. 25, 1973).
4 G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PRO-
TECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 58-60 (1968).
1 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Doc. No. P.R./G.E./3/2 (Feb. 11, 1976).
(See Note on the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on the
Revision of the Paris Convention, Dec. 15-22, 1975), 15 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 46 (January 1976,
Monthly Review of the World Intellectual Property Organization).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
promote the development of new and useful technologies. The de-
velopment of a new and useful technology involves not only the fact
of invention by the individual inventor, but also the development
of the invention into an article of commerce which is capable of
distribution in the marketplace in the finished state which is re-
quired to realize its utility. Often the capital investment in the
commercial development of the initial invention is far greater than
the cost of the act of invention itself.
A patent system fosters this commercial development of useful
technologies in two ways: (1) the disclosure of the invention to the
public in the patent publication makes the technological informa-
tion available for further development by others; and (2) the patent
owner's right to exclude others from making and selling the inven-
tion gives him an incentive to bear the expense of commercial devel-
opment of the invention himself in the hope that he can increase his
market share by patenting a commercially successful product. It is
against both of these benefits to be expected from a patent system
that the effects of an abandonment of patent exclusivity in favor of
certificates of invention must be measured. The extent to which
these benefits are realized depends upon the effectiveness of the
commercial advantage conferred upon the inventor as an incentive
for the disclosure and commercialization of his invention.
The effective commercial advantage conferred by the exclusive
right to make and sell a new item of technology depends upon the
sophistication of the technology and the general state of technologi-
cal development in the market. In many developing countries, the
introduction of a sophisticated technology does not require the grant
of an exclusive legal right to keep competitors from duplicating the
technology and thereby preventing the recovery of development
costs or lessening the market share of the developer who introduces
the commercially successful new technology. This result naturally
obtains because the market forces for supply simply cannot be met
from the existing technological capabilities of industry in the devel-
oping country.' However, once the technological capability of the
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other potential competitors in the market rises to the point required
to duplicate the commercially successful technology or the sophisti-
cation of the technology is such that it can be duplicated by the
existing basic industrial capabilities of the developing nation, then
the need for a legal right to exclude others is greater in order to
protect the investment of the developer and market share. In those
developing countries in which the basic industrial capability is still
low, it can be expected that the absence of exclusive legal rights will
not deter a developer from developing new and useful (i.e., commer-
cially successful) technologies, and to that extent, a shift to certifi-
cates of invention should not affect the incentives for development
by the inventor himself.
On the other hand, what is the incentive for disclosure by publica-
tion in a certificate of invention if such exclusive patent rights are
not conferred? Will the prospect of royalties alone be sufficient to
cause disclosure? Certainly the answer to the latter question can be
made in the affirmative in the case of an inventor who does not
intend to develop commercially the invention himself in the devel-
oping country. This group of inventors will include inventors of so
called "paper inventions," as well as many inventors who would
prefer to exploit their invention by licensing a local industry in the
developing nation to manufacture and sell it, although the value of
such necessarily nonexclusive licenses will be less than the value of
the generally preferred exclusive license. Finally, the inventor who
intends to introduce commercially the invention himself in develop-
ing countries will have no incentive to disclose it in a certificate of
invention unless he is worried about duplication of the commercial
product by competitors. In that event, he may not be willing to
incur the cost of development anyway, since his market share and
market advantage will merely be temporary, and he will have to
settle for royalties from his competitors to offset the cost of and to
provide an incentive for development.
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Thus, as a bottom line, we find the incentives for development
and disclosure intact in every case but one: the inventor who be-
lieves that the industrial capability of the developing country is
such that his potential competitors could duplicate his technologi-
cal advance and who will settle for nothing less than an increase in
his existing share of the market to justify his own development and
introduction of a new technology. Assuming that rational inventors,
foreign or national, do not develop a new technology solely in order
to realize the same profits from the same market share and that the
additional value of royalties from competitors generally does not
justify the cost of development, it can be seen that the effect of
eliminating the inventor's exclusive rights will depend upon the
extent that the industrial capabilities of the developing nation are
perceived as a competitive threat. Hence, the effect of eliminating
patent protection should not greatly diminish the incentives, of
whatever significance they may now be, for the introduction of
greatly advanced technology; however, it may stem the introduction
and development of those technologies for which the developing
nation has already developed a capacity.
The Mexican experience with the certificate of invention should
provide valuable information regarding the effects of eliminating
the exclusive right of the inventor to practice his invention commer-
cially. A careful analysis of that experience should be helpful in
determining whether, in fact, the absence of patent protection does
not act as a deterrent to the transfer of highly sophisticated technol-
ogies into a developing country incapable of duplicating them;
whether the technological growth of a developing country is slowed
by an absence of active foreign and local participation in the devel-
opment of technologies for which a local capacity has already been
developed; and whether, in the long run, the effects of actual and
perceived levels of technological capability in developing countries
will generate a need for reinstitution of a patent-type exclusive right
for inventors and developers.
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